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I. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
What kind of transnational law are we facing in the twenty-first century?
Some commentators argue that even today, there is no real transnational legal
field, only national legal fields and the activities of national actors in national
settings, producing transnational legal activities.! But that reminds me of
something a former law school dean told me sixteen years ago when I said I
was coming to Yale to teach International Business Transactions: that there is
no genuinely transnational body of international business law, because
transnational business law is like that famous non-book, The Law of the
Horse, which consists of Chapter I: "Contracting for a Horse," Chapter II:
"Owning a Horse;" Chapter III, "Torts by a Horse," and Chapter IV:
"Litigating over a Horse."
After teaching International Business Transactions many times, I must
now respectfully disagree. For the most striking change in the law since I
graduated from law school more than two decades ago is the rise of a body of
law that is genuinely transnational-neither fish nor fowl, in the sense that it
is neither traditionally domestic nor traditionally international. Just take the
traditional subjects of the first-term American law school curriculum. Look at
the law of transnational contract, particularly oil development agreements
between multinational oil companies and developing nations. Are these more
like treaties (traditional international law) or more like contracts (traditional
domestic law)? The answer: it is not clear. Or the law of transnational tort-
the Bhopal incident, for example-should that be governed primarily by
Indian law, United States law, or by some emerging international standard of
multinational corporate social responsibility? Again, not clear. Or the law of
transnational crimes-terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons-is
that fundamentally a domestic subject, a subject regulated by international
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regimes, or does it lie somewhere in between? Or finally, the law of
transnational civil procedure: the innovative American Law
Institute/UNIDROIT project on the Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure
has demonstrated that cutting across national borders are transnational
procedural rules on, inter alia, jurisdiction, venue, service of process, and
recognition of judgments; these are procedural rules that are neither local nor
international, but fundamentally transnational in their character. 2 As time
moves on, and commerce, telecommunications, culture and transport become
increasingly globalized, a growing body of law and norms will emerge that is,
on the one hand, universally recognized, but on the other, neither wholly
domestic nor wholly international in its character or origin. Examples will
include the emerging international lex mercatoria of the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), international finance terms used
by the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), international
regulatory rules created by such new global regulatory bodies as the Basle
Committee of Central Bankers, and rules governing international domain
names in cyberspace developed by entities such as the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Network Names (ICANN).
My point is that as international legal academics, we must start treating
transnational law as its own category. Domestic and international processes
and events will soon become so integrated that we will no longer know
whether to characterize certain concepts as local or global in nature. For
example, is the metric system fundamentally national or international? Is
Greenwich Mean Time fundamentally national or international? Is the term
"dot.com" fundamentally national or international? None of these are any
longer questions worth asking, because in each case, the answer is "both." All
have become, over time, genuinely transnational concepts in which a global
standard has become fully recognized, integrated, and internalized into the
domestic system of nearly every nation of the world.
To carry my argument further, perhaps the most intriguing recent change
in this body of transnational law has been the emergence and growth of a large
body of transnational law that is fundamentally public in its character.
Examples include the fields in which I recently worked as a public official-
transnational human rights, democracy, and labor law-but also lav and
development, environmental law, the law of transnational crime, global
cyberlaw, law and public health (e.g., the global AIDS crisis), and
immigration and refugee law. Around the world, public law concepts are
emerging, rooted in shared national norms and emerging international norms,
that have similar or identical meaning in every national system: for example,
the concept of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" in human rights law,
the concept of "civil society" in democracy law, the concept of "the internally
displaced" in refugee and immigration law, or the concept of "transborder
trafficking" of drugs and persons in criminal law. For transnational lawyers,
incorporating these concepts into domestic legal practice has become our
2. See ALIJUNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure Discussion




equivalent of internalizing the global metric system into the American system
of weights and measures. To what extent, for example, should we
acknowledge that police brutality by local American police or prison
conditions in state penitentiaries should meet not only the standards of the
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence, but also the international
standards of torture or arbitrary detention acknowledged by international
bodies? To what extent should our practice of executing juveniles or people
with mental retardation under the Eighth Amendment meet evolving standards
of international decency. 3 To what extent should our understanding of the
legality of same-sex marriage be informed by European or Australian
standards construing treaties and protocols using phrases that are also in
international instruments to which we are a party? And to what extent should
our Supreme Court's recent decision in Bush v. Gore4 be subjected to the
international standards of electoral fairness that we apply in Croatia or Peru or
Ukraine, or the universality of the counting procedures applied in South
Africa? (Indeed, it was precisely because of America's growing insistence
upon a universally understood transnational public law standard for electoral
faimess that the Bush decision has been treated abroad with such smug
satisfaction.)
But if what we are facing in the twenty-first century is a growing body
of transnational law that is inherently public in its character, how should this
change the way American law schools teach their students? By analogy, we
can think of the early part of the last century, when law students in the United
States began thinking of themselves less as lawyers from Alabama or
Connecticut or Oregon than as American lawyers, at which point the leading
U.S. law schools turned away from a primary focus on state and local law and
began teaching something called "national law." National law consisted of
increased emphasis on uniform state rules and federal public law, and the
teaching of professional responsibility by the pervasive method. In the same
way, our current students are becoming increasingly comfortable with the idea
of themselves as inherently multinational or transnational actors, who live in a
world in which territorial borders have vanishing meaning.5 Given that this is
the generation of law students that we will be training, how should this affect
how we teach first-year students, how we teach advanced students, how we
conduct research agendas, and how we teach professional responsibility?
First, it seems to me, we must address the puzzlingly exclusive focus on
domestic law in the traditional first-year American law school curriculum.
Rather than acting as if the world of torts, contracts, criminal law, and
procedure are purely domestic, we should be teaching transnational law by the
pervasive method. For example, in Contracts we should teach the United
3. See Brief of Amici Curiae Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al., McCarver v. North
Carolina (U.S. S.Ct. No. 00-8727, filed June 8, 2001) (making this argument with respect to people with
mental retardation).
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5. This point was brought home to me recently when my preteen son, bom of Korean and
Irish-British ancestry, who has lived in England and traveled widely throughout Europe and North Asia,
announced that he considers himself a native of the planet "Starcraft," who daily fights virtual alien
beings on the "Battlenet," an indeterminate cyberjurisdiction, in which he is aided by cyber-colleagues
who log in from Argentina, Sweden, North Africa, and South Korea!
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Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the
Bhopal case in Torts; World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on protection of
intellectual property in Property law; the Pinochet case in Criminal Law,6 the
rules of transnational civil procedure in Procedure, and the International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in Constitutional Law.
Second, in our advanced courses, we need to prepare our students to deal
adequately with the extraordinary growth of transnational public law. Just as
the major shift in the focus of American law school curriculum and
scholarship after the New Deal was away from the teaching of private law
toward the teaching of public law, I would argue that the major shift of the
twenty-first century law school curriculum will be away from domestic law,
and even from the study of transnational private law subjects, toward the
study of such emerging transnational public law subjects as the Law of
Global Democracy, the Law of Global Governance and Regulation, the Law
of Transnational Crime, The Law of Transnational Injury and Redress, the
Law of Transnational Markets, the Law Of Transnational Dispute Resolution
and the like. As we recognize the growth of transnational public law,
increasingly we will have to focus on the best ways to integrate the teaching
of international and domestic law; to study the ways in which public
authorities do not or do not effectively regulate transnational actors-be they
refugees, businesspeople, human rights activists, or terrorists-and to examine
the issue of democratic deficits in these forms of transnational public
regulation.
This may seem like a daunting task, but we have been here before, not
once, but twice. Over the last generation, law faculties across Europe have
struggled with this very issue, as they have considered how to teach their
students not just about national and international law, but how to teach the
future lawyers of Europe about the intricacies of European law. Nor is this
simply a Western European phenomenon. Lawyers today in East Timor,
Kosovo, Bosnia, and China (particularly those Chinese lawyers attempting to
revamp Chinese law to bring it into compliance with WTO rules) all see their
tasks in precisely the same light: how best to integrate and domesticate
emerging international standards into their rapidly reforming domestic law?
Moreover, we can find a precedent in our own past, by examining
similar episodes in our own legal history. In the early years of the American
republic, when the United States was a small nation with almost no
indigenous law, America was fundamentally a law-taker and a law-borrower.
Early American lawyers, like the Timorese and Kosovar lawyers of today,
were intimately familiar with how international law rules intertwined with
domestic legal rules. 7 But as I have discussed elsewhere, with the twentieth
6. Regina v. Bartle, House of Lords, 24 March 1999, [1999] 2 All ER 97, (1999] 2 WLR
827.
7. As my colleague John Langbein has pointed out in his recent brilliant lectures on the
colonial history of the Yale Law School, one of the most important basic courses offered at the
Litchfield Law School (Yale Law School's progenitor) was on the teaching of the law of nations as
presented in Blackstone's and Kent's Commentaries, a critical device for adapting, internalizing and
integrating international law and British common law into the law of the new American state. See John
H. Langbein, "Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Founding of the Yale Law School." (unpublished
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century and the dawn of the era of American global hegemony, American law
became obsessed with America and the domestic legal agenda largely drove
out the international. As a consequence, many public policy makers-
especially our current judges-learned about law without ever learning or
realizing how much international law is part of our law. 8 During the darkest
days of the Cold War, American public international lawyers became largely
paralyzed by their own perceived impotence and irrelevance.9 But what gave
new energy to the revival of international law in the 1970s and 80s was the
transnational private law boom in international business transactions and
international trade, the rise of the large multinational law firm, and new
mixing of public and private, law and politics in international transactions
with regard to issues such as sovereign immunity, choice of dispute-resolution
fora, and nonstate actors, particularly multinational corporations. These
developments gave new impetus to those who wanted to write about the
integration of international law and other disciplines, as well as the connection
between global governance structures, transnational legal processes, and
national and private agendas.10
Different American law schools have tried different models to educate
their students about the growth of transnational public law. The Harvard Law
School model has traditionally brought large number of foreign students to the
United States to join in conversations with one another and with American
law students.11 The New York University Global Law School model has
recently brought large numbers of foreign professors to the United States to
teach American and foreign students. The Yale Global Constitutionalism
model has recently brought large numbers of foreign judges to hold seminars
paper on file with the author); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2609-10 (1997) (describing the internalization of the law of nations into British and
American common law).
8. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2364
(1991) (arguing that since the Vietnam War, "a generation of lawyers and judges has reached maturity
unaware of America's rich judicial history of applying international law and inclined to accept the recent
status quo ... as normatively desirable") Perhaps only thus could Justice Antonin Scalia argue in his
opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370, n.1 (1989) (emphasis in original), that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit the execution of juveniles for crimes committed at age sixteen, in part
because "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive," and Chief Justice Warren Burger
could write in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) that "[Tlo hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching," without even examining the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the
inconsistency of consensual sodomy laws with the right to respect for private life. See, e.g., Dudgeon
Case, Ser. A., No. 45,4 EHRR 149 (1981); see also Norris v. Ireland, European Court of Human Rights,
1989, Ser. A., No. 142, 13 EHRR 186 (post-Bowers application of Dudgeon).
9. For a history of American international legal scholarship during this era, see Koh, supra
note 7, at 26 14-24.
10. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, The Method is the Message, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 410 (1999) (reviewing methodologies of current international legal scholarship). Ironically,
domestic legal scholars have recently begun to write volumes on the critical importance of norms and
regimes in creating and shaping law. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2001). Yet
for years, norms and regimes have ranked among the biggest items in the international and transnational
lawyers' tool kit. See generally Koh, supra note 7, at 2624-34.
II. For a cogent description of the current Harvard Law School approach, see Anne-Marie
Slaughter, "Global Legal Practice and Global Legal Education," Paper delivered to a panel on "Beyond
State and National Borders: The Growth of Transnational Law" at the Yale Law School Tercentennial
Conference on "Dissolving Boundaries" at 1 (Apr. 28, 2001), at http://www.law.yale.edu/ylspdf/ter-
slaughter.pdf).
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for one another and for students on our campus. But as I learned-at times
painfully-during my recent public service, the best way for American law
professors to learn about the astonishing global changes also happens to be the
most inconvenient-namely, for us to leave the comfort of our offices and to
visit and work in difficult foreign environments-not just to visit abroad on
sabbatical in comfortable Northern Hemisphere universities in Florence,
Berlin, Oxford or Tokyo, but actually to go and conduct research and public
policy work in some of the world's most dynamic centers of legal change, for
example, Indonesia; Nigeria; China; North, West, and South Africa; and the
Balkans.
II. THE OVERLOOKED GLOBALIZATION
This brings me to my third question: in an age of growing transnational
public law, what should our research agenda become? In the academy these
days, all the talk is of globalization. But although most of the focus of law
schools has been on the obvious globalization of ideas, finance, commerce,
and technology, scholars have largely overlooked the remarkable
globalization of human freedom that to my mind marks the most profound
social revolution of our time. Only three decades ago, there were fewer than
twenty-five democracies in the world. Today, by some measures, 120 of the
more than 190 countries in the world qualify, in form if not in substance, as
governments with stated commitments to the preservation of freedom and
democratic self-governance. This means that some 64% of the population on
the planet now lives under some form of democratic rule.
12
Yet in fact, as I found as I dealt daily with governments that nominally
embrace the democratic path, for most of the world's peoples, freedom has
proven to be a distinctly double-edged sword. On the one hand, the collapse of
the Iron Curtain, the decline of dictatorship across Latin America, the rise of a
new continental awareness in Africa, and the retreat by several Asian
autocrats on insistence upon cultural relativism and Asian values, have left
millions newly free to vote, to form political parties, to march in the streets,
and to express their most democratic and heartfelt desires. On the other hand,
the lifting of governmental controls has unleashed for millions as well the
"freedom" to be victims of corruption, trafficking in drugs and human beings,
the spread of disease and environmental damage, and the most terrifying
forms of terrorism, as well as ethnic and communal violence.
To guide this headlong rush to global freedom, what role do we in the
legal academy have to play? My time in the government has confirmed my
worst fears: that in the world of foreign policy, those with ideas have too little
influence; while those with influence have too few ideas. In the policy world,
what academics write about is usually scorned, and more often, utterly
ignored. 13 To be sure, some of the blame properly falls on the bureaucrats and
12. These statistics are drawn from FREEDOM HOUSE, DEMOCRACY'S CENTURY: A SURVEY OF
GLOBAL POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY (1999), available at http:llwww.freedomhouse.org/
reports/century.html.
13. The reaction is best captured by the response of one of my former State Department
[Vol. 26: 305
Points of View
the politicians, but much, I fear falls on us as well. Far too often we speak
only to safe audiences, to one another or our students, in lecture halls far from
the refugee camps, in books and journals whose readership we already know
intimately, and at academic conferences in serene places far from the misery
whose alleviation is ostensibly the object of our academic inquiry. Too rarely
do we speak directly and bluntly to the policymakers who are actively seeking
answers to the world's most vexing problems, but who lack the energy or time
to find the best answers or to seek us out. The irony is that our commitment as
academics to truth and our insulation from politics gives us unique freedom
and independence to speak truth to power. But the question is whether the
hard-won privilege of choosing our audiences will lead us unwittingly to
squander that freedom, in the name of not getting our own hands dirty.
During the 1960s and 70s, American public law academics helped to
shape the work of the American civil rights and antiwar 
movements. 14
Similarly, when the Cold War ended, the academic community helped to build
an impressive array of nongovernmental institutions to help educate newly
free peoples on the responsibilities and opportunities posed by their newfound
freedom. 15 A major challenge currently facing global policymakers is
deciding, as we marketize globally and democratize locally, how best to
promote human rights without sacrificing cultural values. t6 How can we use
the globalization of human freedom to help solve emerging global problems
(for example, global AIDS, global warming, transnational crime, refugee
crises, and the like)? As uniquely privileged individuals, legal scholars have a
special obligation to use their positions of academic privilege to leave the
ivory tower to address these questions. We must teach others how to
perpetuate their new and frightening freedom through the construction of wise
restraints, the teaching of cultural understanding and tolerance, the
development of self-sustaining social, political and economic institutions, and
the acceptance of human dignity and human rights as genuinely universal
values.
Fourth and finally, we must ask what as transnational law scholars we
should teach in the way of professional responsibility to our global law
colleagues, Morton Halperin, to the academic work on global democracy that has focused on the so-
called "democratic peace": the massively overstudied question of whether or not democracies fight with
each other. Seee.g., DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1996). Halperin
posits that the only reason that no two democracies have been found to fight with one another is that,
until now, there have been so few democracies, and that if and when two democracies do end up
fighting, academics will turn their attention to proving that one or the other of the combatants, upon
analysis, is not really a democracy after all!
14. An extraordinarily inspiring example was my late Yale colleague, Charles L. Black, Jr.,
who was not only an important player in drafting the brief in Brown v. Board of Education, but also
wrote law review articles defending the lawfulness of the desegregration decisions. See Charles L.
Blacl, Jr., WASH. POST, May 13, 2001, at B6.
15. These have included the Open Society Institute, the Central European University, the
National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican
Institute, as well as innumerable university centers and research institutes that were built to advance the
study of post-Cold War democratic transition and development. These institutions have made
outstanding contributions, and the need for individuals committed to their mission has only accelerated
in the last few years,
16. For a particularly penetrating analysis of these questions, see Amy L. Chua, The Paradox
of Free Market Democracy, Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287 (2000).
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students? If we want our students to be what Dean Kronman calls "lawyer-
statesmen," not just scriveners for the new global era, we should urge them-
through clinical training, exhortation, and example-to be transnational
lawyers who serve not just private interests, but public values. Our students
should see themselves not just as passive facilitators of client desires, but as
skeptical interlocutors with those who would make global decisions without
reference to transnational public norms. 17 Like the late Abe Chayes, we must
teach our students to argue with their clients, to challenge them, to question
what they are doing, and to urge them to direct their private activity into
lawful channels. By identifying otherwise invisible legal constraints and
finding available legal channels through which policy decisions can flow,
transnational lawyers can help shape policy decisions, which in turn shape
legal instruments, which in time become internalized into institutional
decisionmaking processes, the key to promoting the growth and development
of a vibrant system of transnational public law.'
All of this paints a fascinating picture of the explosive growth of
transnational public law and its growing importance in the real world. A
rational response by the American legal academy would be rapid changes in
our first-term curriculum, our upper-level courses, oiur own scholarly and
research agendas, and our approach to the subject of professional
responsibility. Yet surprisingly, my sense is that things are not yet going this
way. At a time when the American legal academy should be turning outward,
we are instead turning inward. My main impression upon returning to
academia from a rapidly globalizing world, in which transnational public law
is of accelerating importance, is that many fellow legal academics not only are
unaware of the growth of transnational public law, but are talking less and less
about law altogether.
So let me end this essay not with an answer, but with a question: why is
it that the American legal academy appears to turning away from the study of
law at precisely the moment that globalization has finally started to make the
study of law really interesting?
17. No ethical law professor would seriously encourage a student to negotiate a deal for a
corporate client with a state or local government in the United States that massively violated human
rights, devastated the environment, or destroyed indigenous homelands. Yet few professors of
international business transactions teach their students systematically about the public implications of
transnational commercial arrangements their multinational corporate clients might enter into with
foreign governments that might have the same result. For a significant exception, see DETLEV VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 147-62 (2d ed. 1998). Significantly, nearly all the people
identified by Dean Kronman as "lawyer-statesmen" were international lawyers. But over time,
individuals such as Dean Acheson, Henry Stimson, John MeCloy, and Robert Jackson evolved from the
public international lawyer-architects of the post WWII World Order to the "in-and-outer." They
became transnational lawyers, who have served not only as public servants, but also as partners of
major multinational transactional firms. Lawyers such as Cyrus Vance, Carla Hills, Paul Wamke, Stuart
Eizenstat, Charlene Barshefsky, and Robert Rubin have exemplified this trend. See ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11-12 (1993).
18. For a description of how Abe Chayes did this, both as a public and a private lawyer, see
Harold Hongju Koh, An Uncommon Lawyer, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 7, 8 (2001); see also David E.
Rosenbaum, Abram Chayes, John Kennedy Aide Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, at B8 (quoting
Chayes) (There is "nothing wrong with holding the United States to its own best standards and best
principles.").
19. See generally Koh, supra note 7; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75
NEB. L. REV. 181, 206-08 (1996) (discussing the public role and obligations oftransnational lawyers).
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